Baskin-Robbins Item 19: $521K median ($441K P25, $776K P75) across 844 franchised shops. Why the low absolute revenue still works at the low end of the investment range — and where the category headwinds bite.
Quick answer: Baskin-Robbins’ Item 19 reports a $521K median across 844 franchised shops — a low absolute number that still works at the low end of the $307K-$627K investment range. The AUV-to-investment ratio runs ~1.1× at the midpoint and 1.5× at the low end. The 1.76× P75/P25 ratio means there’s real distribution between strong and weak sites — site selection drives a much bigger share of the outcome here than at brands with tighter cohort spreads.
Baskin-Robbins’ most recent Item 19:
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Sample size | 844 franchised shops |
| Sample criteria | All franchised units (no tenure filter) |
| Median annual revenue | $521,177 |
| P25 annual revenue | $440,648 |
| P75 annual revenue | $775,806 |
| P75/P25 ratio | 1.76 |
| Total system units | 976 |
| Total investment (Item 7) | $307,400 - $626,700 |
| Franchise fee | $25,000 |
| Royalty rate | 0.5% to 5.9% |
| Ad fund | 2.5% to 5.0% |
The disclosure is methodologically conservative: 844 franchised units, no tenure filter, all-franchised cohort. The cohort spread is wider than peers like Club Pilates (1.40 P75/P25) or Crumbl (similar), reflecting real differences between strong-trade-area and weak-trade-area shops. A buyer in the franchise should expect the site-selection variable to dominate the eventual outcome.
The royalty structure is unusual: a 0.5% to 5.9% range. The variable royalty rate is typically tied to specific product categories (ice cream vs. cake vs. beverages) and franchise agreement terms negotiated at different historical points. New franchise agreements tend toward the higher end of the published range; legacy agreements (franchisees who acquired shops decades ago) often sit lower.
Baskin-Robbins produces a median annual revenue ($521K) that’s roughly a third of comparable QSR concepts. Three structural reasons explain this:
Lower customer frequency. A Baskin-Robbins customer visits an average of perhaps 8-12 times per year. A Dunkin’ customer visits 50-150+ times per year. Frequency drives volume; volume drives AUV. Ice cream is treat-frequency, not meal-frequency.
Lower average ticket. Typical Baskin-Robbins transaction runs $7-$12 (a couple of scoops, a sundae, or a quart). Typical meal QSR ticket is $12-$18 or more. The product itself has structurally lower ticket size.
Narrower daypart. Baskin-Robbins skews heavily to afternoon, evening, and weekend traffic. Morning hours produce minimal revenue (the brand has experimented with breakfast and coffee tie-ins with limited success). Compare to a multi-daypart QSR that captures breakfast, lunch, afternoon snack, and dinner.
The reason the deal still works is that the investment scales down with the revenue. A $307K-$627K investment range is meaningfully lower than Dunkin’ ($501K-$1.95M), Wingstop ($342K-$1.0M at the new range), or most fast-casual concepts. At the low end of the Baskin-Robbins range, the AUV-to-investment ratio is competitive even with the modest absolute revenue.
The deal is a low-revenue, low-investment, low-complexity franchise. It’s not going to make anyone rich, but for an operator who prefers simpler operations and lower capital risk, it produces real cash flow at acceptable returns.
The single biggest revenue-mix differentiator among Baskin-Robbins shops is the cake business. Shops with strong custom-cake and decorated-cake programs can do $100K-$200K of incremental annual revenue from cakes alone — the difference between the P25 ($441K) and the median ($521K) is largely explained by cake mix.
The cake business has favorable economics on top of the revenue impact:
For a buyer, the implication is that the cake business is the lever you can pull. Brand standards include cake programs, but the operating intensity an owner-operator puts behind cake sales (local marketing, event-occasion targeting, retail merchandising) varies widely across the system. The P25-to-P75 spread is largely the cake-execution spread.
| Brand | Sample | Median AUV | Investment | AUV/Investment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Baskin-Robbins | 844 | $521K | $307K-$627K | 1.1× |
| Crumbl | 858 | $1.09M | $574K-$818K | 1.6× |
| Cold Stone Creamery | larger | $400K-$600K (est.) | $315K-$500K | 1.3× |
| Dairy Queen | larger | $700K-$1.2M (est.) | $1.1M-$2M | 0.7× |
| Ben & Jerry’s Scoop Shop | smaller | $400K-$700K (est.) | $200K-$450K | 1.5× |
| Carvel | smaller | $400K-$600K (est.) | $300K-$500K | 1.3× |
Baskin-Robbins sits in the middle of the dessert franchise peer set on absolute AUV and ratio. Crumbl is the standout — higher revenue and stronger ratio — but Crumbl is in a different category (warm cookies, dine-out occasion) with different operating intensity. The traditional ice cream subcategory (Baskin-Robbins, Cold Stone, Carvel) has converged on similar economics: modest absolute revenue, modest ratios, simpler operating model than meal QSR.
For deeper category context, see our Crumbl Item 19 cohort analysis and broader guide to low-cost franchises under $100K.
A new Baskin-Robbins shop in months 1-12 typically generates:
That’s 65-80% of the system median. Baskin-Robbins ramps faster than most franchises because:
Year two typically reaches the system median or close to it. The shops that materially exceed the median (P75 territory at $776K+) are those with strong cake-program execution, high-foot-traffic locations, and operators who treat the shop as a community-event business rather than a passive retail format.
For broader category context, see our low-cost franchise breakdown and Item 19 average vs. median. For brand-specific cost detail, the live Baskin-Robbins franchise page.
Baskin-Robbins' most recent Item 19 reports a $521,177 median annual revenue across 844 franchised shops. P25 is $440,648 and P75 is $775,806. The disclosure covers all franchised units with no tenure filter — methodologically conservative.
Baskin-Robbins is a dessert-and-treat business, not a meal business. Customer transaction frequency is lower (occasional treat vs. daily meal), average ticket sizes are lower ($8-$12 vs. $12-$18 for meal QSR), and the dayparts are narrower (afternoon/evening skew). The brand has improved cake and ice-cream-cake mix in recent years to lift ticket and capture event spending, but the structural ceiling is lower than a meal-driven QSR like Dunkin' or McDonald's.
At the midpoint, it's modest. $521K of median revenue against $467K of investment (Item 7 midpoint) produces a ratio of roughly 1.1×. The ratio improves at the low end of the investment range — a $300K-$350K conversion site against $521K of revenue produces a 1.5× ratio, which is competitive for low-investment franchises. The deal economics depend heavily on site selection and absolute investment level.
Often yes — Baskin-Robbins' mature system, established brand recognition, and seasonal customer patterns mean new shops ramp faster than most franchise concepts. Year-one revenue typically tracks 65-80% of the system median ($340K-$420K), but a strong site in a high-foot-traffic location can hit or exceed median by month nine. The brand's 60+ years of trade-area presence in many U.S. markets reduces awareness-build time.
Item 7 reports a total initial investment range of $307,400 to $626,700. The franchise fee is $25,000. Royalty runs 0.5% to 5.9% (typically tied to product mix and term); ad fund contribution runs 2.5% to 5.0%. The low end of the investment range is one of the lower entry points among national franchise brands of this scale.
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