Buffalo Wild Wings Item 19: $3.44M median ($2.37M P25, $4.88M P75) across 527 franchised restaurants. Why the $2.5M-$4.9M investment range determines whether the deal works — and how BWW compares to casual dining peers.
Quick answer: Buffalo Wild Wings’ Item 19 reports a $3.44M median across 527 franchised restaurants — high absolute revenue, with a wide cohort spread ($2.37M P25 to $4.88M P75). The investment range of $2.46M-$4.90M means the AUV-to-investment ratio runs ~0.94× at the midpoint. The deal works for operators who build at the low end of the investment range or acquire existing high-performing units; new full-build deals at the upper end are tight. Site selection determines whether you’re a P75 outcome ($4.88M+) or a P25 outcome ($2.37M).
Buffalo Wild Wings’ most recent Item 19:
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Sample size | 527 franchised restaurants |
| Sample criteria | All franchised units (no tenure filter) |
| Median annual revenue | $3,442,790 |
| P25 annual revenue | $2,371,905 |
| P75 annual revenue | $4,875,869 |
| P75/P25 ratio | 2.06 |
| Total system units | 538 |
| Total investment (Item 7) | $2,463,945 - $4,900,320 |
| Franchise fee | $25,000 |
| Royalty rate | 0.5% to 5.0% |
| Ad fund | 2.0% to 4.0% |
The 527-restaurant sample is large by casual-dining standards and is restricted to franchised units. Disclosure is methodologically conservative — no tenure filter, no qualified-restaurant exclusion. The cohort spread is wide: P75/P25 of 2.06× means the top quarter of the franchised system earns more than twice what the bottom quarter earns. That spread is the most important number on the page for a prospective buyer.
What the disclosure tells you is that trade-area selection is the dominant variable. Two BWW restaurants in different trade areas can produce $2.4M and $4.9M respectively — that’s not a 20% operational gap, it’s a structural demand gap. The brand operates with materially different unit economics across its franchised footprint, and a buyer’s job is to land on the right side of that distribution.
Three structural factors drive the 2× P75/P25 spread:
Sports-event demand is hyper-local. A BWW in a college town with a Division I football program produces enormous Saturday revenue 6-10 times per fall. A BWW in a market without that anchor produces flat weekend revenue. NFL, NBA, MLB, and major UFC events all amplify trade-area-specific demand patterns. Restaurants in trade areas with multiple aligned sports anchors compound the effect.
The beverage and bar business varies hugely by trade area. Alcohol mix at a BWW can range from 18% to 35% of total revenue. Trade areas with strong sports-bar culture push toward the high end; family-suburb trade areas push toward the low end. Alcohol carries higher contribution margin than food, so beverage mix variation drives both revenue AND profitability variation.
Catering and group-event revenue is operator-driven. Strong BWW operators build pickup-and-delivery catering programs for game-day group orders, corporate events, and team meals. Weak operators ignore the catering channel. The difference is $200K-$600K of incremental annual revenue at a strong location, and it’s almost entirely a function of operator initiative rather than trade-area structure.
For a buyer, the implication is that BWW is a trade-area-first deal. The brand is strong, the operating model is proven, the unit economics work — but only if the trade area supports the business model. A weak trade area cannot be operated into the median; a strong trade area can be operated significantly above it.
A $3.44M median against $3.68M of investment (Item 7 midpoint) produces a ratio of roughly 0.94×. That’s well below the historical “good franchise” threshold of 1.5×+ and reflects the casual-dining build-out reality:
There are two paths to making the ratio work:
Build at the low end. A conversion of an existing casual-dining footprint (closed Applebee’s, Chili’s, or comparable) can come in at $2.5M-$3.0M all-in vs. the upper-bound $4.9M of a full new-build. At $2.7M of investment against $3.4M of revenue, the ratio is 1.26× — still tight but workable.
Buy existing units in strong trade areas. Acquiring an existing P75 unit at $4.88M of revenue produces stronger cash-on-cash returns than building a new unit, even at acquisition premiums. Multi-unit operators in the franchise system frequently grow this way rather than through new builds.
For deeper category context on casual-dining unit economics, see our Applebee’s Item 19 deep dive (n=1,443, $2.64M median, similar category economics).
| Brand | Sample | Median AUV | Investment | AUV/Investment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Buffalo Wild Wings | 527 | $3.44M | $2.46M-$4.90M | 0.94× |
| Applebee’s | 1,443 | $2.64M | $1.5M-$3M (est.) | 1.2× |
| Twin Peaks | smaller | $5M+ (est.) | $4M-$7M | 0.7-1× |
| Hooters | smaller | $3M+ (est.) | $2.5M-$4M | 0.9× |
| Chili’s (corporate) | larger | $3.4M (est.) | $1.5M-$2.5M | 1.5× |
| TGI Friday’s | smaller | $2.5M (est.) | $1.5M-$3M | 1.1× |
BWW sits at the top of the casual-dining peer set on absolute AUV, comparable to Twin Peaks at lower investment. The ratio is similar to Hooters and slightly below Applebee’s. The category (full-service casual dining with bar focus) is broadly capital-intensive; ratios above 1.5× are rare in the segment.
For broader context, see our Wingstop vs Buffalo Wild Wings comparison and the Applebee’s Item 19 deep dive for a structurally comparable concept.
A new Buffalo Wild Wings restaurant in months 1-12 typically generates:
That’s 80-95% of the system median. BWW benefits structurally from:
Year two typically reaches or exceeds the system median in strong trade areas. The trade-area dependency is the main risk variable; a weak trade area can keep a restaurant at $2.4M-$2.8M indefinitely with no path to median through operational improvement alone.
For broader category context, see our Wingstop vs Buffalo Wild Wings franchise comparison and Item 19 average vs. median. For brand-specific cost detail, the live Buffalo Wild Wings franchise page.
Buffalo Wild Wings' most recent Item 19 reports a $3,442,790 median annual revenue across 527 franchised restaurants. P25 is $2,371,905 and P75 is $4,875,869. The disclosure covers all franchised units with no tenure filter — methodologically conservative.
The 2.06× P75/P25 ratio reflects the meaningful difference between BWW restaurants in strong sports-bar trade areas (college towns, dense suburbs with strong sports culture, urban entertainment districts) and weak trade areas. A BWW in a strong trade area benefits from sports-event traffic spikes, season-long catering revenue, and high beverage attach rates — all of which are highly site-specific. The wide spread is a real signal that site selection drives outcomes more than at brands with structurally consistent demand patterns.
At the midpoint, it's modest. $3.44M of median revenue against $3.68M of investment (Item 7 midpoint) produces a ratio of roughly 0.94×. The ratio improves for operators who buy or build at the low end of the investment range — a $2.5M all-in build against $3.44M of revenue produces a 1.4× ratio. The category (casual dining with bar focus) is heavy on build-out, which structurally caps the ratio.
Often yes, or close to it. Buffalo Wild Wings benefits from strong national brand recognition, sports-event demand drivers that create immediate traffic moments (NFL season opener, March Madness, NBA Finals), and a multi-daypart business (lunch, dinner, late-night, weekend brunch in some markets) that produces revenue from day one. Year-one revenue typically lands at 80-95% of the system median, faster than membership-based concepts.
Item 7 reports a total initial investment range of $2,463,945 to $4,900,320. The franchise fee is $25,000. Royalty runs 0.5% to 5.0% (typically structured with introductory rates that step up over time); ad fund contribution runs 2.0% to 4.0%. The build-out is heavy because the restaurant format requires large bar capacity, TV infrastructure (often 30-60 screens), kitchen depth for the wing-and-sauce SKU expansion, and ample seating.
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