Burger King Item 19: $1.64M median across 4,774 franchisee-owned Traditional Restaurants in calendar 2024. Format filter explained, year-one ramp, and how Burger King compares to McDonald's and Wendy's.
Quick answer: Burger King’s Item 19 reports a $1.64M median across 4,774 franchisee-owned Traditional Restaurants for calendar 2024 — one of the largest QSR Item 19 samples (second only to Dunkin’s 7,010). The Traditional-only filter is important: it excludes non-traditional locations (airports, gas station co-locations, food courts) that have fundamentally different unit economics. At $2M-$4.7M of investment, the AUV-to-investment ratio is tight by historical franchise standards.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Sample size | 4,774 franchisee-owned restaurants |
| Sample criteria | Traditional Restaurants - Franchisee-Owned |
| Reporting period | January 1, 2024 – December 31, 2024 |
| Median annual gross sales | $1,638,579 |
| Total system units | 5,524 |
| Total investment (Item 7) | $2,049,200 - $4,705,600 |
| Royalty rate | 4.5% of gross sales |
The 4,774-restaurant sample is the second-largest in our Item 19 database, behind Dunkin’s 7,010. The reporting period is full calendar 2024, recent and clean. The format filter excludes non-traditional locations — and the impact of that filter is significant: non-traditional Burger King locations (airports, food courts, hospitals, gas station kiosks) operate under fundamentally different economics, with smaller footprints, different menu mixes, captive customer bases, and lower absolute AUVs.
Including non-traditional in the median would average together different business models. Restricting to Traditional Restaurants produces the cleanest read on the core franchise format that 95%+ of new buyers are evaluating.
A $1.64M median against $2.05M-$4.71M of investment produces an AUV-to-investment ratio of 0.4-0.8×. That’s below the 1× threshold that historically defined attractive franchise unit economics. The reason isn’t a Burger King weakness — it’s structural to mature QSR with heavy real estate intensity.
Three factors compress the ratio:
Real estate is expensive. A Burger King Traditional Restaurant requires a 2,500-3,500 sq ft building with drive-thru, on a meaningful parcel (typically 0.75-1.25 acres) in a high-traffic location. The land and building cost is $1.5M-$3M for new construction in most markets, before equipment and franchise fees. That denominator weight is unavoidable in the format.
The brand is mature. Burger King has been franchised since 1959. Market penetration is high in most US markets — new restaurants compete against existing Burger King locations and a saturated QSR field. Growth markets that produce above-median AUVs are rarer than in newer brands.
Category competition is intense. McDonald’s, Wendy’s, Carl’s Jr/Hardee’s, and increasingly Wingstop and Popeyes compete for the same fast-food traffic. Burger King has been losing relative share to chicken-focused competitors since the 2019 chicken sandwich launch period, which compresses category-wide growth tailwind.
For new buyers, the implication is that Burger King makes sense as part of a multi-unit operating strategy — typically 5+ restaurants under one operator — where management overhead is amortized across multiple units. Single-unit deals in attractive markets face structural friction; the franchise system favors multi-unit operators with proven track records.
| Brand | Sample | Median AUV | Investment | AUV/Investment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| McDonald’s | n/a (mostly company) | ~$3M+ co. | varies | n/a |
| Burger King | 4,774 | $1.64M | $2.05M-$4.71M | 0.5× |
| Wendy’s | n/a public Item 19 | ~$1.8M-$2.0M | $2.5M-$3.5M | 0.6× |
| Five Guys | smaller | $1.2M-$1.6M | $300K-$700K | 2.5× |
| Whataburger | mostly company | n/a | varies | n/a |
| Hardee’s / Carl’s Jr | varies | $1.0M-$1.4M | $1.5M-$2.5M | 0.5× |
| Freddy’s | 463 | $1.83M | $855K-$2.8M | 1.0× |
Within the burger category, Burger King’s $1.64M median is competitive with Wendy’s and ahead of Hardee’s/Carl’s Jr. Five Guys produces a much stronger ratio because of its lower investment profile but at lower absolute AUV. Freddy’s (covered in our Freddy’s Item 19 deep dive) sits in a comparable AUV range at materially lower investment. McDonald’s company-operated AUVs sit at a higher level but reflect a different operating model.
The structural picture: mature QSR with heavy real estate requirements (Burger King, Wendy’s, Hardee’s) all share the tight AUV-to-investment ratio. Lighter-format QSR (Five Guys, Wingstop, Freddy’s) produces stronger ratios. The choice depends on operator profile and capital availability.
A new Burger King Traditional Restaurant typically generates 75-85% of system median in year one — $1.25M-$1.40M. Month-by-month:
Year two typically lands at $1.45M-$1.65M as customer base matures and operations tune. Year three approaches or hits the system median. The ramp is faster than membership-model businesses (boutique fitness, senior care) but slower than chicken QSR with strong category tailwinds.
For multi-unit operators opening their 5th or 10th restaurant, the ramp is faster because operational infrastructure and supplier relationships transfer. For first-time single-unit operators, the ramp can be slower because all operating systems are being built from scratch.
For broader context, see our best burger franchises roundup. For brand-specific cost detail, see the live Burger King franchise page.
Burger King's most recent Item 19 reports a $1,638,579 median annual gross sales across 4,774 franchisee-owned Traditional Restaurants for calendar year 2024.
Burger King operates two distinct formats: Traditional Restaurants (full-format free-standing or end-cap units) and Non-Traditional Locations (airports, military bases, hospitals, gas station co-locations, food courts). Non-Traditional locations have fundamentally different revenue, investment, and operating economics — blending them with Traditional in the median would distort the disclosure. The Traditional-only filter produces a cleaner read on the core franchise format.
McDonald's typically reports higher median AUVs ($3M+ for company-operated units), but McDonald's is overwhelmingly company-operated and franchisees operate under a different model (long-term lease relationships with the company). Burger King's $1.64M franchisee-owned median is genuinely the franchise reality, while McDonald's published figures often reflect company-store performance that doesn't translate directly to franchise unit economics.
At the median, the ratio is below 1× — $1.64M of AUV against $2M-$4.7M of investment produces a ratio of 0.4-0.8×. That's characteristic of mature QSR with heavy real estate intensity. The ratio works at scale (multi-unit operators) but is tight for single-unit buyers. Burger King's franchise base is dominated by multi-unit operators for this reason.
Year-one new-build revenue typically lands at 75-85% of the system median — $1.25M-$1.40M. The ramp to steady-state is faster than membership-driven businesses but slower than chicken QSR. Multi-unit operators with prior brand experience ramp fastest.
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