# Burger King Item 19 Deep Dive: $1.64M Median Across 4,774 Traditional Restaurants

> Burger King Item 19: $1.64M median across 4,774 franchisee-owned Traditional Restaurants in calendar 2024. Format filter explained, year-one ramp, and how Burger King compares to McDonald's and Wendy's.

**Last updated**: 2026-06-05
**URL**: https://vetmyfranchise.com/blog/burger-king-item-19-deep-dive?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md

> **Quick answer:** [Burger King](/franchise/burger-king-company-llc?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md)'s Item 19 reports a $1.64M median across 4,774 franchisee-owned Traditional Restaurants for calendar 2024 — one of the largest QSR Item 19 samples (second only to Dunkin's 7,010). The Traditional-only filter is important: it excludes non-traditional locations (airports, gas station co-locations, food courts) that have fundamentally different unit economics. At $2M-$4.7M of investment, the AUV-to-investment ratio is tight by historical franchise standards.

## The Disclosure

| Metric | Value |
|---|---:|
| Sample size | 4,774 franchisee-owned restaurants |
| Sample criteria | Traditional Restaurants - Franchisee-Owned |
| Reporting period | January 1, 2024 – December 31, 2024 |
| Median annual gross sales | $1,638,579 |
| Total system units | 5,524 |
| Total investment (Item 7) | $2,049,200 - $4,705,600 |
| Royalty rate | 4.5% of gross sales |

The 4,774-restaurant sample is the second-largest in our Item 19 database, behind Dunkin's 7,010. The reporting period is full calendar 2024, recent and clean. The format filter excludes non-traditional locations — and the impact of that filter is significant: non-traditional [Burger King](/franchise/burger-king-company-llc?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md) locations (airports, food courts, hospitals, gas station kiosks) operate under fundamentally different economics, with smaller footprints, different menu mixes, captive customer bases, and lower absolute AUVs.

Including non-traditional in the median would average together different business models. Restricting to Traditional Restaurants produces the cleanest read on the core franchise format that 95%+ of new buyers are evaluating.

## Why the AUV-to-Investment Ratio Is Tight

A $1.64M median against $2.05M-$4.71M of investment produces an AUV-to-investment ratio of 0.4-0.8×. That's below the 1× threshold that historically defined attractive franchise unit economics. The reason isn't a [Burger King](/franchise/burger-king-company-llc?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md) weakness — it's structural to mature QSR with heavy real estate intensity.

Three factors compress the ratio:

**Real estate is expensive.** A [Burger King](/franchise/burger-king-company-llc?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md) Traditional Restaurant requires a 2,500-3,500 sq ft building with drive-thru, on a meaningful parcel (typically 0.75-1.25 acres) in a high-traffic location. The land and building cost is $1.5M-$3M for new construction in most markets, before equipment and franchise fees. That denominator weight is unavoidable in the format.

**The brand is mature.** Burger King has been franchised since 1959. Market penetration is high in most US markets — new restaurants compete against existing Burger King locations and a saturated QSR field. Growth markets that produce above-median AUVs are rarer than in newer brands.

**Category competition is intense.** [McDonald's](/franchise/mcdonalds-usa-llc?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md), Wendy's, Carl's Jr/Hardee's, and increasingly [Wingstop](/franchise/wingstop-franchising-llc?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md) and Popeyes compete for the same fast-food traffic. Burger King has been losing relative share to chicken-focused competitors since the 2019 chicken sandwich launch period, which compresses category-wide growth tailwind.

For new buyers, the implication is that Burger King makes sense as part of a multi-unit operating strategy — typically 5+ restaurants under one operator — where management overhead is amortized across multiple units. Single-unit deals in attractive markets face structural friction; the franchise system favors multi-unit operators with proven track records.

## How Burger King Compares to Burger QSR Peers

| Brand | Sample | Median AUV | Investment | AUV/Investment |
|---|---:|---:|---|---:|
| [McDonald's](/franchise/mcdonalds-usa-llc?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md) | n/a (mostly company) | ~$3M+ co. | varies | n/a |
| Burger King | 4,774 | $1.64M | $2.05M-$4.71M | 0.5× |
| Wendy's | n/a public Item 19 | ~$1.8M-$2.0M | $2.5M-$3.5M | 0.6× |
| Five Guys | smaller | $1.2M-$1.6M | $300K-$700K | 2.5× |
| Whataburger | mostly company | n/a | varies | n/a |
| Hardee's / Carl's Jr | varies | $1.0M-$1.4M | $1.5M-$2.5M | 0.5× |
| [Freddy's](/franchise/freddys-llc?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md) | 463 | $1.83M | $855K-$2.8M | 1.0× |

Within the burger category, Burger King's $1.64M median is competitive with Wendy's and ahead of Hardee's/Carl's Jr. Five Guys produces a much stronger ratio because of its lower investment profile but at lower absolute AUV. [Freddy's](/franchise/freddys-llc?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md) (covered in our [Freddy's Item 19 deep dive](/blog/freddys-frozen-custard-item-19-deep-dive?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md)) sits in a comparable AUV range at materially lower investment. [McDonald's](/franchise/mcdonalds-usa-llc?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md) company-operated AUVs sit at a higher level but reflect a different operating model.

The structural picture: mature QSR with heavy real estate requirements (Burger King, Wendy's, Hardee's) all share the tight AUV-to-investment ratio. Lighter-format QSR (Five Guys, [Wingstop](/franchise/wingstop-franchising-llc?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md), [Freddy's](/franchise/freddys-llc?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md)) produces stronger ratios. The choice depends on operator profile and capital availability.

## Year-One Ramp

A new Burger King Traditional Restaurant typically generates 75-85% of system median in year one — $1.25M-$1.40M. Month-by-month:

- Months 1-3: $115K-$140K monthly (opening burst, settling)
- Months 4-6: $105K-$125K monthly (operations tuning)
- Months 7-9: $110K-$130K monthly (customer base building)
- Months 10-12: $115K-$140K monthly (approaching steady-state)
- Annualized year-one: $1.25M-$1.45M

Year two typically lands at $1.45M-$1.65M as customer base matures and operations tune. Year three approaches or hits the system median. The ramp is faster than membership-model businesses (boutique fitness, senior care) but slower than chicken QSR with strong category tailwinds.

For multi-unit operators opening their 5th or 10th restaurant, the ramp is faster because operational infrastructure and supplier relationships transfer. For first-time single-unit operators, the ramp can be slower because all operating systems are being built from scratch.

## What This Means for Buyers

- **The Item 19 is methodologically clean and large-sample.** 4,774 franchisee-owned restaurants over a full calendar year produces a defensible median.
- **The format filter matters.** Traditional Restaurant economics differ materially from Non-Traditional locations. The disclosed median describes the dominant franchise format.
- **The investment-to-revenue dynamics favor multi-unit operators.** Single-unit deals work but require operational discipline. Multi-unit operators amortize overhead better.
- **Underwrite year-one at 75-85% of median.** Plan for $1.25M-$1.45M of year-one revenue and ramp to the median over 24-30 months.
- **Category competition is structural.** Burger King is competitive within the burger category but the category as a whole has been losing share to chicken-focused competitors. Underwriting against historical share trajectories is optimistic.

For broader context, see our [best burger franchises](/blog/best-burger-franchises?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md) roundup. For brand-specific cost detail, the live `/franchise/burger-king-company-llc` page.

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## Brands mentioned in this post

- [Burger King](/franchise/burger-king-company-llc?utm_source=claude&utm_medium=ai_referral&utm_campaign=vmf_agent_md)
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