Wingstop Item 19: $2.0M median AUV across 1,759 units in the 2025 fiscal period. What the median means for new operators, ramp expectations, and how it compares to category peers.
Quick answer: Wingstop’s most recent Item 19 reports a $2.0M median AUV across 1,759 franchised units — one of the largest disclosed samples in QSR. The number is real and the sample is unusually well-substantiated. What the median doesn’t tell you is that mature multi-unit operators dominate the system, year-one revenue tracks materially below the median while units ramp, and single-unit territory is structurally hard to obtain.
The headline number from Wingstop’s most recent FDD Item 19 disclosure is a $2,001,753 median annual unit volume across 1,759 franchised units in the 52-week fiscal period ending December 27, 2025. That sample size is unusually large for franchise disclosure. Most Item 19 figures buyers encounter cover 50-200 units; Wingstop’s covers nearly 1,800. At that scale, the median is genuinely representative of the operating system, not a top-tier subset.
For a buyer evaluating a new build, the relevant question isn’t whether the $2M median is accurate. It is. The question is what the distribution behind that median looks like, what year-one revenue looks like for new units, and what kind of operator the system rewards. Item 19 reports the headline figure. The interpretation requires more work.
Sample size in Item 19 is the single best signal of how seriously to take the number. A franchisor reporting a $1.5M average on 12 units is reporting what the top 12 operators earned — closures and underperformers have been removed, and the population is too small to be representative. A franchisor reporting on 1,700+ units is reporting what the system actually earns, with the natural averaging effect of large numbers.
Across the 2,000+ FDDs in our database, only a handful of brands disclose Item 19 with samples above 1,000 units. The list is dominated by mature category leaders: Dunkin’, Burger King, Great Clips, Wingstop, Sport Clips. The size of the sample isn’t a coincidence — these are the systems with enough scale to make a representative disclosure, and the operational confidence to do so.
Wingstop’s sample also covers “franchised units” with no tenure subset specified. Many brands restrict their Item 19 to “units open at least 12 months” or “units open at least 24 months” — filters that strip out the ramp-stage population and inflate the disclosed median. Wingstop’s disclosure includes the full franchised population, which is methodologically more conservative and produces a more defensible figure.
The structure of Wingstop’s most recent Item 19 disclosure:
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Sample size | 1,759 franchised units |
| Reporting period | 52-week fiscal period ending Dec 27, 2025 |
| Median annual unit volume | $2,001,753 |
| Total system units | 2,586 |
| Total investment (Item 7) | $310,400 - $1,013,500 |
| Royalty rate | 6% of gross sales |
Three things worth pulling out of that table. First, the median sits very close to $2M — a round number, but the precision of $2,001,753 reflects the actual calculation, not a rounded estimate. Second, the reporting period is a full 52-week fiscal year, not a calendar year, which is standard for QSR FDDs. Third, the AUV-to-investment ratio is exceptional: a $2M median against a $310K-$1M investment range produces an AUV-to-mid-investment ratio above 3:1, which is the strongest in publicly franchised chicken.
The $2.0M median represents what a Wingstop store earns when it’s fully ramped. New units don’t earn that in year one. The system median includes operators who have been running their unit for 5, 8, 10+ years and benefit from:
A new Wingstop in a new market typically reaches 50-70% of the system median in year one and ramps toward the median over 24-36 months. A new Wingstop in a strong existing Wingstop market (where customers already know the brand) can ramp faster — sometimes hitting 80%+ of the median in year one — but those markets typically have constrained territory availability.
The defensible underwriting move is to model year-one revenue at $1.2M-$1.5M (60-75% of the median), year-two at $1.5M-$1.8M, and year-three at the median or above. If the pro forma the franchisor sends you starts at the $2M median in year one, you’re being shown a chart that ignores the ramp curve — see our pro forma decoder for the broader pattern.
A category snapshot using comparable Item 19 medians:
| Brand | Item 19 sample | Median AUV | Total investment | AUV/Investment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wingstop | 1,759 | $2.0M | $310K-$1M | 3.0x |
| Popeyes | 2,186 | $1.9M | $383K-$3.5M | 1.0x |
| Bojangles | 470 | $2.2M | $1.0M-$2.5M | 1.3x |
| KFC | n/a in disclosed | ~$1.5M | $1.4M-$3.3M | 0.6x |
| Buffalo Wild Wings | 527 | $3.4M | $2.6M-$4.4M | 1.0x |
Wingstop leads the category on AUV-to-investment ratio by a wide margin. Popeyes and Buffalo Wild Wings produce higher AUVs in absolute terms but at substantially higher investment, which compresses the ratio. KFC requires meaningfully more capital and produces lower AUV; Bojangles is competitive on AUV but at higher investment.
This ratio is the single number that makes Wingstop attractive to multi-unit operators and dominant in development pipelines. It’s also why single-unit territory is structurally hard to obtain — the franchise system actively recruits multi-unit candidates with capacity to develop 3-10 stores, and area development agreements typically take priority over single-unit applicants in attractive markets.
If you’re evaluating Wingstop:
For broader category context, see our best chicken franchises 2026 roundup. For the detailed cost picture, our Wingstop franchise cost post covers Item 7 in depth. The brand’s /financials sub-page on Wingstop carries the live Item 19 data and is updated when the FDD is.
Wingstop's most recent Item 19 reports a $2.0M median annual unit volume (technically $2,001,753) across 1,759 franchised units in the 52-week fiscal period ending December 27, 2025. This is one of the largest disclosed Item 19 samples in the QSR category.
The 1,759-unit sample is large enough to be statistically meaningful — closures and outliers don't materially shift the median at that scale. The metric reflects all franchised units in the period, not a top-tier subset. Compared to Item 19 disclosures with sub-100 unit samples, Wingstop's is unusually well-substantiated.
Almost never. Year-one new-build revenue at Wingstop typically runs materially below the system median while the unit ramps. The system median includes mature units that have been operating for 3-10+ years and benefit from established brand awareness, customer base, and operational tuning. Underwrite to a more conservative year-one figure and ramp to the median over 24-36 months.
Wingstop's $2.0M median places it at the top of the publicly franchised chicken category by AUV-to-investment ratio. Popeyes' median is comparable in absolute terms but at a higher investment ($383K-$3.5M). KFC and Bojangles run lower medians. Raising Cane's would likely lead the category but doesn't franchise.
Three structural reasons: compact 1,400-2,200 sq ft footprint keeps buildout under $1M, simplified cooking infrastructure (no fryer-heavy kitchen) keeps labor and equipment cost low, and the focused wing-and-tender menu produces strong throughput. The combination of high AUV and modest total investment is what makes the ratio category-leading.
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